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CORPORATE SOPHISTRY EXPOSED?
Donald Shelby Chisum*
Up THE ORGANIZATION: HOW TO STOP THE CORPORATION FROM
STIFLING PEOPLE AND STRANGLING PROFITS. By Robert Townsend.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970. Pp. 202. $5.95.
Robert Townsend's Up The Organization is not a book intended
for scholarly consumption. Even less is it a book addressed to legal
minds. The author is a successful corporate manager, and his witty
little book is intended to function for America's corporate executives
(or at least those who wish to escape the orthodox) much as Mao's
Quotations functions for the World's political revolutionaries. Up
The Organization is chock full of aphorisms and other compact
wisdom on how to survive, prosper, and spread your influence in the
corporate jungle by engaging in "nonviolent guerrilla warfare."1 While
Townsend's professed objective is the humanization of corporate
organizations, he also clearly considers his ideas to be conducive to
greater profits. To facilitate its usefulness as a tract for action, Town-
send divides his book into 97 chapters-each only a page or two in
length-and each centered on a single (sometimes titillating) concept.
The chapters are then arranged alphabetically. Thus, the table of
contents/index runs "Advertising... Budgets... Ejaculation, Prema-
ture... Mistresses ... Office Party, How Not to Do the Annual...
Racism . . ." etc.
Yet Up The Organization is not without serious interest to law-
yers. On the mundane level, of course, is the chapter "Lawyers Can Be
Liabilities."' A good lawyer is one who gives you his home phone,
works and travels on weekends, and carries the corporate seal in his
briefcase. A lawyer to be avoided is one who talks Middle English and
recites statutory paragraph numbers. And the chapter on "Delegation
of Authority" offers an unusual suggestion for the relation between
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Stanford, 1966, LL.E.,
1968.
1. R. Towsa n, Up =E ORGAazAnoN 10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Tow~saNw].
2. TowxsmD, at 97.
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corporate counsel and the chief corporate executive.' Townsend
suggests the abolition of the standard procedure of sending drafts of
legal documents to the executive for review and revision. Rather he
suggests that the chief set a firm policy that he will simply sign
(without reading!) legal documents sent to him covering transactions
the terms of which he has already approved. Time and legal fees will
be saved, and the responsibility for proper drafting will be placed
where it belongs-on the lawyer.
On a higher level, Up The Organization should be of interest
to lawyers because it provides some valuable insights into the reality
and morality of organizational behavior in the modern American
corporation. This kind of background is essential to members of the
legal profession who are involved in the process of formulating, en-
forcing, and revising the legal rules that establish the rights and duties
of the various constituents of corporate hierarchies.
For example, it is useful to compare the legal position of corporate
directors with the picture of directors which Townsend draws. Under
the law of virtually every American jurisdiction, the directors, func-
tioning as a body, are enthroned as managers of the business and affairs
of the corporation. The directors are entrusted with the ultimate
authority to make most of the decisions concerning corporate affairs.
Correspondingly, directors bear the ultimate responsibility for the
results of those decisions. The law imposes on them duties of loyalty
and reasonable care in their supervision of the corporation. For the
breach of those duties, they are personally liable for damage caused
to the corporation and its owners, the shareholders.
Townsend gives us quite a different picture of directors.4
[D]irectors are usually the friends of the chief executive put
there to keep him safely in office. They meet once a month, gaze
at the financial window dressing (never at the operating figures
by which managers run the business), listen to the chief and his
team talk superficially about the state of the operation, make
token suggestions (courteously recorded and subsequently ig-
nored), and adjourn until next month.
Townsend does not view this state of affairs as an evil. Rather he
3. TowNsEND, at 47-48.
4. ToWNSEND, at 49.
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considers it essential to the health of the corporate organization and the
interests of the shareholders. Regular inquiry and evaluation by direc-
tors of the performance of operating personnel is like "pulling up the
flowers to see how the roots are growing."' In fact, the imposition of
legal duties of care on directors creates a problem that must be solved.
Conscientious directors who worry about their obligations must be
diverted from acting to fulfill them. Townsend suggests cocktails and
a heavy lunch before each directors' meeting; an older director will
fall asleep and create such embarrassment that everyone will be anxious
to adjourn after the formalities are over.
Townsend sees only two legitimate functions for directors: declaring
dividends and judging the chief executive officer's performance.6 To
perform these tasks, they need only meet quarterly and review financial
information.
The reality that many directors do not direct has bothered legal com-
mentators for some time.' But the analysis has tended to run in the
direction of how to prod directors into fulfilling their duties. Town-
send's experienced views suggest that such analysis may be mis-
directed. Perhaps the legal doctrine that directors of large corporations
manage and devote a certain level of attention to the corporation's
business-beyond declaring dividends and firing chief executives-
ought to be abrogated as unrealistic and deceptive to the shareholders.
Certainly the doctrine should not be maintained while being subverted
with indemnification and insurance schemes that leave the illusion
but not the reality of responsibility 8
Up The Organization offers many other morsels that should pro-
vide food for legal thought. Townsend is extremely critical of long-term
employment contracts for managers.' Good men should be kept by
being continuously challenged and rewarded. Lesser men should not
have a contractual grip on their job.10 This suggests that perhaps the
S. Towa ss, at 51.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HAv. L. R!v. 1305 (1934).
8. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078 (1968).
9. TowNsEND, at 56.
10. Townsend does not confine his criticism to the corporate world: "At the root
of the disaster in American education today is the tenure system ...And don't think
the kids don't know it." TowNsND, at 56. He has other barbs for academia; the American
Association of University Professors is termed "a bloody nuisance." TowNsEN, at 96.
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law has not been strict enough in its scrutiny of such contracts.1 The
management class may be unwilling because of self-interest to temper
the demands for job security. And shareholder action to curtail such
contracts may simply not be practical. 2
And we are reminded of the sad truth that "the vast majority of
corporations are still operating with dice loaded against Jews, black
people and women of all races and creeds."' Townsend suggests action
within the corporate world. The legal profession should ask itself why
equal opportunity laws are not more effective and what it can do to
make them effective. And it should put its own house in order.
Townsend is a strong advocate of making as many corporate em-
ployees as possible stockholders. In fact, he views employee stock
ownership as essential to the maintenance of vitality in large, estab-
lished, publically-held corporations. He cites the continuing success of
Sears, Roebuck 22% of whose stock is held in an "Employees' Profit-
Sharing Fund." He notes that "your lawyers . . . will try to talk you
out of this sensible impulse [to make employees stockholders]."'" If
employee-ownership is a sound model for corporate structure from a
business and economic point of view, then perhaps the legal profession
should devote more effort to ironing out some of the lingering problems.
These problems include: how should control over such "Profit-Sharing
Trusts" be allocated? how should the exercise of such control be
supervised? how can distortion of the capital markets be avoided?
Overall, Up The Organization will not strike the lawyer as a revo-
lutionary text in its audit of the American corporate system. Its call
is more for the revival of that kind of Old-Time Religion that used to
be taught in corporation law classes. For example, Townsend is
critical of the present "priorities" of big corporations (1. the Chief
Executive and his Directors, 2. Management, 3. Employees, 4. Cus-
11. On the general subject of long-term employment contracts, see CARY, CooahnA-
TIONS CASES AND MATERiALS, 222-28 (4th Ed. 1969).
12. The recent experience of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. is instructive. MGM has
gone through a series of changes of control. Past presidents generally received five-year
contracts. A recent shareholder proposal to limit employment agreements to a maximum
of two years was defeated. But the newest president, James T. Aubrey, did state that the
key executives of the latest control group had not signed contracts and that "there
won't be any long-term 'expensive guarantees of employment' under his leadership."
Wall Street Journal, Friday, Jan. 16, 1970, at 6 cois. 1-3.
13. TowiNsE n, at 161.
14. TOwNSEND, at 178.
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tomers, and then 5. Stockholders) and suggests a new line-up (1.
Stockholders, 2. Customers, 3. Management and Employees, and 4.
Directors-unpaid).'" Management should stop worrying about the
price of the corporation's stock and stick to the fundamentals of
making a profit. Accounting rules should not be manipulated or
changed midstream to improve the corporation's apparent performance.
Corporations should concentrate rather than diversify. Mergers should
be avoided-and are at best necessary evils."6 Corporations should not
engage in philanthropy.
In short, Up The Organization is a light-hearted and low-horizon
book. It does not deal with the big problems that are bothering students
of the American corporate scene. But then big problems are not every-
body's bag.
15. TowNsEND, at 177.
16. Townsend's advice has a tinge of irony in relation to his own past experience. He
successfully renovated Avis Rent-a-Car Corporation as its chief executive, only to see it
sold out to a conglomerate-International Telephone and Telegraph. ToWNsEND, at 141.
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